Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mu'alem, Ahuva ; Nisan, Noam |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 64.2008, 2, p. 612-631
|
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Theorie | Theory |
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