Truthful, budget-balanced bundle double auctions for carrier collaboration
Year of publication: |
November 2017
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Authors: | Xu, Su Xiu ; Huang, George Q. ; Cheng, Meng |
Published in: |
Transportation science : a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : Transportation Science & Logistics Society of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, ISSN 0041-1655, ZDB-ID 160958-0. - Vol. 51.2017, 4, p. 1365-1386
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Subject: | carrier collaboration | bilateral exchange | mechanism design | effective auctions | incentive compatibility | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Unternehmenskooperation | Inter-firm cooperation | Leistungsbündel | Bundling strategy | Auktion | Auction |
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