Truthful equilibria in dynamic Bayesian games
Year of publication: |
September 2015
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Authors: | Hörner, Johannes ; Takahashi, Satoru ; Vieille, Nicolas |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 83.2015, 5, p. 1795-1848
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Subject: | Bayesian games | repeated games | folk theorem | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem |
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