Turkey?s New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of it? A Game Theoretical Approach
Currently there are more than 15.4 million Refugees in the world (UNHCR, 2012 ). They are amongst the most vulnerable groups of people and in desperate situations fearing persecution in their country of origin. Governments and international agencies though are facing the twin problems of providing adequate humanitarian assistance for them and to avoid floods of asylum seekers. Turkey belongs to the original signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention, however maintains the geographical limitation, mainly due to economic concerns, and thereby defines a refugee as a person from Europe fleeing persecution. Therewith Turkey follows an asylum policy which allows only European asylum-seekers from EU member states to apply for refugee status in Turkey. Human rights organizations but also the EU (European Union), the ECtHR(The European Court of Human Rights) and the UNHCR(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) asked Turkey to lift the geographical limitation. In January 2011 Turkey released its first draft asylum law which was adopted by the parliament on 4 April 2013. Among the reforms harmonizing Turkey?s legislation on justice, freedom, and security with EU acquis, the most important step has been adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection which introduced a new legal and institutional framework for migration and asylum. The EU has recognized and appreciated Turkey?s adoption of these reforms, particularly in the middle of the Syrian refugee crisis. Even if the new law meets most of the EU requirements except of lifting the geographical limitation; it was perceived as a clear sign of Turkey?s efforts to establish an effective migration management system in line with EU standards. Keeping the geographical limitation in the law, Turkey gave a clear message to the EU that without a proper chance of becoming an EU member, she has no incentive to follow EU requirements to lift the geographical limitation. This paper analyses Turkey?s asylum policy from a game theoretical approach within the potential EU Membership context. Specifically, the payoff matrix of Turkey and the EU (Lift/Don?t Lift & Membership /No Membership) will be deeply discussed so as to question why Turkey, as one of the few countries in the world, still keeps a geographical limitation for refugees, what it has to do with its political and cultural position as well as with a potential EU membership. This paper aims to shed light to mixed policy strategies including the implementation of a burden sharing system that, independent of an EU membership, will assure Turkey adequate help in case of a mass influx.