Two-dimensional mechanism design and implementability by an indirect mechanism
Year of publication: |
October 2017
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Authors: | Kojima, Naoki |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics letters. - Irvine, Calif. : Scientific Research, ISSN 2162-2078, ZDB-ID 2657454-8. - Vol. 7.2017, 6, p. 1595-1601
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Subject: | Multi-Dimensional Mechanism | Indirect Mechanism | Budget Constraint | Reduction of Dimension | Revelation Principle | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
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