Two-Part Tariffs and Monopoly Profits When Visits Are Variable
A two-part tariff exists when a fixed payment is made before any purchases are allowed. When buyers visit a monopolist more than once per period, they have the ability to substitute between visits and consumption per visit. This substitution weakens the surplus-extracting power of a two-part tariff; and in some cases it is more profitable to abandon the entry fee altogether.
Year of publication: |
1983
|
---|---|
Authors: | Phillips, Owen R. ; Battalio, Raymond C. |
Published in: |
Bell Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0361-915X. - Vol. 14.1983, 2, p. 601-604
|
Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Optimal prices and animal consumers in congested markets
Battalio, Raymond Charles, (1986)
-
Sunk and opportunity costs in valuation and bidding
Phillips, Owen R., (1991)
-
Optimal prices and animal consumers in congested markets: a reply
Battalio, Raymond Charles, (1987)
- More ...