Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Delacrétaz, David ; Loertscher, Simon ; Marx, Leslie M. ; Wilkening, Tom |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 179.2019, p. 416-454
|
Subject: | Assignment games | Decomposability | Impossibility theorems | Mechanism design | Size-dependent discounts | Allokation | Allocation | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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