Two-sided matching with (almost) one-sided preferences
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Haeringer, Guillaume ; Iehlé, Vincent |
Published in: |
American economic journal : a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1945-7669, ZDB-ID 2442378-6. - Vol. 11.2019, 3, p. 155-190
|
Subject: | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Matching | Stabilität eines Gleichgewichts | Stability of equilibrium | Theorie | Theory |
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