Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers.
This article analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two-sided search. Agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on [0, 1]. Their utility is equal to the index of their mate. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents inside their class. Marriage brokers match agents according to a centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a uniform participation fee, only agents of higher quality participate in the centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a commission on the matching surplus, only agents of lower quality go to the intermediary. Copyright 2000 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Bloch, Francis ; Ryder, Harl |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 41.2000, 1, p. 93-115
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
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