Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Romero-Medina, Antonio ; Triossi, Matteo |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-1270, ZDB-ID 1459207-1. - Vol. 50.2021, 1, p. 105-118
|
Subject: | Many-to-many | Acyclicity | Stability | Strategy-proofness | Matching | Suchtheorie | Search theory | Allokation | Allocation | Arbeitsuche | Job search | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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