Two simple characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution
Year of publication: |
2018
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Authors: | Mori, Osamu |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 189247-2. - Vol. 85.2018, 2, p. 225-232
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Subject: | Axiomatic characterization | Egalitarian Pareto optimality | Nash bargaining solution | Sandwich axiom | Strong undominatedness by the disagreement point | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Verhandlungen | Negotiations |
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