Un effet pervers de la responsabilité limitée
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ollier, Sandrine |
Published in: |
Recherches économiques de Louvain. - Bruxelles : De Boeck, ISSN 0770-4518, ZDB-ID 281002-5. - Vol. 72.2006, 3, p. 265-286
|
Subject: | Arbeitskräfte | Workforce | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability |
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