Un enfoque de diseño de mercados para la selección de personal del Instituto Nacional Electoral en México

In this document we propose a model based in matching games to analyze the problem of workers' selection by the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. After a revision of the theoretically relevant results, an allocation mechanism is proposed to select the workers. This mechanism improves the existing procedure.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Cantala, David ; Sempere, Jaume
Published in:	Estudios Económicos. - Centro de Estudios Económicos. - Vol. 30.2015, 1, p. 75-92
Publisher:	Centro de Estudios Económicos
Subject:	Instituto Nacional Electoral \| administración pública \| matching \| mechanism design

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011171646