Uncertainty and Insurance in Strategic Market Games.

In perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and a formulation with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over in a particular context of imperfect competition, strategic market games the Shapley-Shubik way.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Weyers, S.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	GAMES \| GAME THEORY \| UNCERTAINTY \| INSURANCE

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	34 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779547