Uncertainty resolution in tax experiments: Why waiting for an audit increases compliance

Tax compliance in a between-subjects experiment was higher when the uncertainty about the occurrence of an audit was not resolved until three weeks after participants had filed their tax returns than in a control treatment with immediate uncertainty resolution. Results have important implications for experimental tax research where providing immediate feedback whether participants are audited is common practice.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Muehlbacher, Stephan ; Mittone, Luigi ; Kastlunger, Barbara ; Kirchler, Erich
Published in:	Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics). - Elsevier, ISSN 2214-8043. - Vol. 41.2012, 3, p. 289-291
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Tax compliance \| Tax experiments \| Audits \| Uncertainty resolution

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D84 - Expectations; Speculations ; D90 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth. General ; H26 - Tax Evasion
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573915