Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria
We study the problem of reaching Nash equilibria in multi-person games that are repeatedly played, under the assumption of uncoupledness: every player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by ?finite-state automata, and characterize the minimal number of states needed in order to guarantee that a pure Nash equilibrium is reached in every game where such an equilibrium exists.
Year of publication: |
2007-08
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Authors: | Babichenko, Yakov |
Institutions: | Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
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