Underpricing and CEO Stock Options : Do Board Characteristics Matter?

This paper examines the conditions under which CEOs are able to affect the timing and the price of the stock options they are granted at the time of their firm's IPO. Contrary to Lowry and Murphy (2007) who do not find a relationship between IPO grants and IPO underpricing, this paper finds such a relationship when board independence, the power of the CEO and venture capital (VC) backing are taken into account. The results suggest that powerful CEOs and VCs are able to reap substantial gains from IPO options to the detriment of the shareholders

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Chahine, Salim
Other Persons:	Goergen, Marc (contributor)
Publisher:	[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Wirtschaftsgeschichte \| Economic history \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Aktienoption \| Stock option \| Vorstand \| Executive board \| Corporate Governance \| Corporate governance

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (54 p)
Series:	ECGI Finance Working Paper ; No. 257
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 19, 2009 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1468557 [DOI]
Classification:	G20 - Financial Institutions and Services. General ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150987