Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies

We revisit the problem of providing a pure public good in economies involving two agents, under the assumption that preferences are quasilinear. We characterize the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible mechanisms that are not dominated by another strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible mechanism

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Efthymios, Athanasiou ; Valletta, Giacomo
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (38 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 13, 2018 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3300604 [DOI]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014109468