Unemployment and Employment Protection in a Unionized Economy with Search Frictions
In the theoretical literature, the effects of employment protection on unemployment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection reduces job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal. Copyright 2008 The Author. Journal compilation CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008.
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Stähler, Nikolai |
Published in: |
LABOUR. - Centro di Studi Internazionali Sull'Economia e la Sviluppo (CEIS). - Vol. 22.2008, 2, p. 271-289
|
Publisher: |
Centro di Studi Internazionali Sull'Economia e la Sviluppo (CEIS) |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Unemployment and employment protection in a unionized economy with search frictions
Stähler, Nikolai, (2007)
-
Taxing deficits to restrain government spending and foster capital accumulation
Stähler, Nikolai, (2007)
-
Employment protection and temporary work agencies
Baumann, Florian, (2008)
- More ...