Unemployment Insurance, Recall Expectations, and Unemployment Outcomes.
This paper empirically examines the importance of explicitly accounting for the layoff-rehire process in the analysis of unemployment outcomes in the United States. The authors find that the spells of individuals who initially expect to be recalled account for much more of the unemployment of unemployment insurance recipients that do spells actually ending in recall. The results indicate that the recall and new job escape rates from unemployment have quite different time patterns and are often affected in opposite ways by explanatory variables. The authors also find that the probability of leaving unemployment both through recalls and new job finding increases greatly around the time that unemployment insurance benefits lapse. Copyright 1990, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Year of publication: |
1990
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Authors: | Katz, Lawrence F ; Meyer, Bruce D |
Published in: |
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. - MIT Press. - Vol. 105.1990, 4, p. 973-1002
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
Saved in:
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