Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision
Year of publication: |
2004-03
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Authors: | Thomas, Jonathan ; Worral, Tim |
Institutions: | School of Economics, University of Edinburgh |
Subject: | Social Insurance | Moral Hazard | Limited Commitment | Unemployment Insurance | Crowding Out |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | 2 pages long |
Classification: | D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; H31 - Household ; H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions ; J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings |
Source: |
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Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment:Public versus Private Provision
Worall, Tim, (2005)
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Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public vs Private Provision
Thomas, Jonathan, (2002)
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Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public vs Private Provision
Thomas, Jonathan P, (2002)
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Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
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Bankruptcy Proceedings for Sovereign State Insolvency and their Effect on Capital Flows
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Limited Commitment Models of the Labour Market
Thomas, Jonathan, (2007)
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