Unequal Remuneration in Agency Relationships

This paper demonstrates that a principal may optimally remunerate her agents unequally, even if these have equal characteristics. We show this in a simple moral hazard model where agents' efforts are continuous choice variables. Unequal remuneration allows the principal to minimize implementation costs, but causes an inefficient allocation of efforts

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Weinschenk, Philipp
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Vergütungssystem \| Compensation system \| Theorie \| Theory \| Lohn \| Wages \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (15 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 12, 2021 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3941136 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322535