Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information

We establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan (1971) pseudo-metric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semi-continuous when the information fields of players change (even with the weak topology on players' strategy sets), and is approximately lower semi-continuous.

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Year of publication:	2007-04
Authors:	Einy, Ezra ; Haimanko, Ori ; Moreno, Diego ; Shitovitz, Benyamin
Institutions:	Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Subject:	Zero-Sum Games \| Differential Information \| Value \| Op-timal Strategies \| Uniform Continuity

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Revised version of Discussion Paper # 04-04 of Monaster Center for Economic Research, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Number 2007-02 18 pages long
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004992507