Uniformly bounded information and social choice
The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive integer [beta] such that for each pair of alternatives, {a,b}, there exists a set S(a,b) of at most [beta] alternatives such that a and b can be socially ordered on the basis of the profile of preferences restricted to just S(a,b), then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial on a rich sub-domain of profiles.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S. |
Published in: |
Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 45.2009, 7-8, p. 415-421
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Chromatic graphs Infinite set Social welfare function |
Saved in:
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