Unifying voting theory from Nakamura’s to Greenberg’s theorems
Cycles, empty cores, intransitivities, and other complexities affect group decision and voting rules. Approaches that prevent these difficulties include the Nakamura number, Greenberg’s theorem, and single peaked preferences. The results derived here subsume and significantly extend these assertions while providing a common explanation for these seemingly dissimilar conclusions.
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Saari, Donald G. |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 69.2014, C, p. 1-11
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Decisions and elections : explaining the unexpected
Saari, Donald, (2001)
-
Saari, Donald, (1994)
-
Apportionment Methods and the House of Representatives
Saari, Donald G., (1977)
- More ...