Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy

Kai A. Konrad; Marcel Thum

We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements. -- Mitigation ; international climate agreements ; bargaining ; unilateral advances

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A. ; Thum, Marcel
Publisher:	Berlin : WZB
Subject:	Klimaschutz \| Climate protection \| Umweltabkommen \| International environmental agreement \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Umweltkosten \| Environmental costs \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 13 S., 268,36 KB)
Series:	Discussion paper / Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research Area Markets and Choice, Research Professorship & Project The Future of Fiscal Federalism. - Berlin : WZB, ZDB-ID 2688082-9. - Vol. SP II 2011-109
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/54580 [Handle]
Classification:	Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters ; Q58 - Government Policy ; F53 - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009407577