Union Egalitarianism as Income Insurance.
It is a common observation that unions often try to compress the wage distribution among their members as compared with the productivity distribution. A troublesome aspect of standard theories of redistributive unions is the question why high-productivity workers choose to enter the union in the first place. This paper develops and explores the implications of an alternative insurance rationale for egalitarian wage objectives. Apart from providing a simple explanation of why heterogeneous union members may agree on egalitarian wage policies, it also suggests a more guarded attitude toward the welfare costs of pay compression. Copyright 1992 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Agell, Jonas ; Lommerud, Kjell Erik |
Published in: |
Economica. - London School of Economics (LSE). - Vol. 59.1992, 235, p. 295-310
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Publisher: |
London School of Economics (LSE) |
Saved in:
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