Union power, cost of job loss, and workers' effort.
The authors hypothesize that the effectiveness of external threats in raising workers' effort is mediated by, among other labor market conditions, the presence or absence of a powerful union. In particular, they argue that because powerful unions reduce the potency of the external threat of job loss (by making it more difficult for employers to dismiss workers), the pace of work is less responsive to such a threat in strongly unionized plants than in weakly unionized plants. The results of an analysis of data from the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey in Britain support this hypothesis. The analysis also yields evidence that effort is increased where workers are rewarded individually according to results, and where there are various communication channels between workers and management. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Green, Francis ; McIntosh, Steven |
Published in: |
Industrial and Labor Relations Review. - School of Industrial & Labor Relations, ISSN 0019-7939. - Vol. 51.1998, 3, p. 363-383
|
Publisher: |
School of Industrial & Labor Relations |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Working on the chain gang? : An examination of rising effort levels in Europe in the 1990s
Green, Francis, (2000)
-
'Overeducation' and skills : clarifying the concepts
Green, Francis, (1999)
-
Is there a genuine under-utilization of skills amongst the over-qualified?
Green, Francis, (2007)
- More ...