Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets
Year of publication: |
1992-11
|
---|---|
Authors: | Albæk, Svend ; Overgaard, Per Baltzer |
Institutions: | Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet |
Subject: | signalling games | equilibrium refinement | uniqueness | finite response sets | continuum sets |
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