Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model with risk-averse players
Year of publication: |
März 2016
|
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Authors: | Eraslan, Hülya |
Published in: |
International journal of economic theory. - Richmond, Vic. : Wiley Publishing Asia, ISSN 1742-7355, ZDB-ID 2206587-8. - Vol. 12.2016, 1, p. 29-40
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Subject: | non-cooperative bargaining | multilateral bargaining | legislative bargaining | uniqueness | risk-averse players | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Diskontierung | Discounting | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Verhandlungen | Negotiations |
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