Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
There exist social choice rules for which every manipulation benefits everyone. This paper constructs a large variety of rules with this property and provides two characterizations of such rules. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Campbell, Donald ; Kelly, Jerry |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 43.2014, 2, p. 329-355
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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