Unobservable transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the manager is evaluated using a balanced scorecard
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Hamamura, Jumpei |
Published in: |
Advances in accounting : a research annual. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0882-6110, ZDB-ID 722244-0. - Vol. 44.2019, p. 22-28
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Subject: | Strategic transfer pricing | Observability | Balanced scorecard | Price competition | Noncooperative game theory | Balanced Scorecard | Verrechnungspreis | Transfer pricing | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Preiswettbewerb |
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