Unobserved correlation in private-value ascending auctions
In private-value ascending auctions, the winner's willingness to pay is not observed, leading to underidentification of many econometric models. I calculate tight bounds on expected revenue and optimal reserve price for the case of symmetric and affiliated private values.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Quint, Daniel |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 100.2008, 3, p. 432-434
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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