Unraveling in a dynamic matching market with Nash bargaining

Equilibrium sorting in a finite-horizon, two-sided matching market with heterogeneous agents is considered. It is shown that, if the match production function is additively separable in agent-types and if the division of match output is determined by the Nash bargaining solution, then an unraveling of the market obtains as the unique equilibrium in which all matches are formed in the first period.

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Year of publication:	2003-07-28
Authors:	Chen, Frederick
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2003, 17, p. 1-6
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629571