Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives

We investigate the effects of downstream firms’ managerial incentives on upstream collusion. Downstream profit-and-revenue incentive schemes make upstream manufacturers easier to collude than a pure-profit incentive scheme does when retailers compete in prices. However, the opposite occurs under quantity competition.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Bian, Junsong ; Lai, Kin Keung ; Hua, Zhongsheng
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 118.2013, 1, p. 97-100
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Collusion \| Incentive \| Vertical channel \| Price and quantity competition

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D2 - Production and Organizations ; L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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