Upstream monopoly and downstream information sharing

Pio Baake and Andreas Harasser

We analyze a vertical structure with an upstream monopoly and two downstream retailers. Demand is uncertain but each retailer receives an informative private signal about the state of the demand. We construct an incentive compatible and ex ante balanced mechanism which induces the retailers to share their information truthfully. Information sharing can be profitable for the retailers but is likely to be detrimental for social welfare.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Baake, Pio ; Harasser, Andreas
Publisher:	Berlin : DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research
Subject:	information sharing \| upstream monopoly \| vertical relations \| Theorie \| Theory \| Monopol \| Monopoly \| Vertikale Integration \| Vertical integration \| Lieferantenmanagement \| Supplier relationship management \| Wissenstransfer \| Knowledge transfer \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Informationsverbreitung \| Information dissemination \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. - Berlin : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1619-4535, ZDB-ID 2125067-4. - Vol. 1635
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/149898 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011595482