Usefulness Lost : Aggregating Information with Differing Levels of Verifiability

In this paper, we study information asymmetries about verifiability between a principal and an agent. Our main result is that an information asymmetry about verifiability not only reduces the usefulness of a given performance measure for stewardship purposes, it can completely destroy that performance measure's usefulness

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Year of publication:	[2006]
Authors:	Glover, Jonathan C.
Other Persons:	Ijiri, Yuji (contributor) ; Levine, Carolyn B. (contributor) ; Liang, Pierre Jinghong (contributor)
Publisher:	[2006]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (29 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.715207 [DOI]
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; M41 - Accounting
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012735245