Using Different Budgeting Procedures to Coordinate Principal-Agent Relationships

This paper deals with a moral hazard problem resulting from a combined hidden action and hidden information situation.

Year of publication:	1999-07-27
Authors:	Hofmann, Christian
Subject:	Moral hazard \| Agency-Theorie \| Anreizsystem \| Ressourcen

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Extent:	23 p. application/pdf
Series:	Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen - Abteilung Unternehmensrechnung und Controlling
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; M40 - Accounting and Auditing. General ; Management and organisation. Other aspects ; Auditing and management control ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005840491