Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis

This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Albrecht, James ; van Ours, Jan C.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Personalbeschaffung \| Recruitment \| Signalling \| Schätzung \| Estimation \| Qualifikation \| Occupational qualification \| Niederlande \| Netherlands

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (21 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2001 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.291722 [DOI]
Classification:	I20 - Education. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320726