Using mechanism design theory in negotiations to improve purchasing performance
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schulze-Horn, Ines ; Pulles, Niels ; Schiele, Holger ; Scheffler, Paul |
Published in: |
International journal of procurement management. - Genève : Inderscience Enterprises Ltd., ISSN 1753-8432, ZDB-ID 2422777-8. - Vol. 11.2018, 6, p. 777-800
|
Subject: | game theory | mechanism design theory | market design | negotiation | purchasing performance | case study | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Beschaffung | Procurement |
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