Using reserve prices to deter collusion in procurement competition
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | Thomas, Charles J. |
Published in: |
The journal of industrial economics. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0022-1821, ZDB-ID 218160-5. - Vol. 53.2005, 3, p. 301-326
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Subject: | Kartell | Cartel | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Theorie | Theory |
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