Value of public information in sender–receiver games

I find in two classes of sender–receiver games that the receiver’s equilibrium payoff is not increasing in the informativeness of a public signal because the sender may transmit less information when the public signal is more informative.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Chen, Ying
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 114.2012, 3, p. 343-345
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Value of information \| Sender–receiver games \| Cheap talk

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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