Variation of the electorate: Veto and purge
In the paradigm social choice problem, there is a fixed set of alternatives and a fixed set of voters. This essay considers variations of the electorate when some subset of voters has a special voice on some subset of alternatives. We formalized such a situation by means of the veto function. We focus on stable veto functions, exhibit a stable liberal social choice function and promotion mechanism, and investigate a notion of stability for groups whose membership itself is the social state. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983
Year of publication: |
1983
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gardner, Roy |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 40.1983, 3, p. 237-247
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Games for business and economics
Gardner, Roy J., (1995)
-
Gardner, Roy, (1981)
-
The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism
Gardner, Roy, (1980)
- More ...