Vertical Integration and International Predation.
This paper investigates the interrelationship between a firm's incentive to engage in international predatory pricing and its domestic vertical industry ties in the context of the deep-pocket theory of predation. The deep pocket stems from a vertically integrated firm's ability to shift funds between its upstream and downstream divisions, enabling it to prey on vertically unintegrated upstream competitors. Vertical integration is shown to function as a cause of and a deterrent to foreign predatory behavior. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Bernhofen, Daniel M |
Published in: |
Review of International Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0965-7576. - Vol. 4.1996, 1, p. 90-98
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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