Vertical integration through Rubinstein bargaining

We consider a vertical structure in which an upstream manufacturer bargains with a downstream retailer over the price of an intermediate good. In an alternating offers framework, we show that when the managers of the firms can choose their response time in the negotiation that the solution conforms either to the non-intergrated or fully integrated structure from standard models of successive monopoly.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Clark, Derek J ; Pereau, Jean-Christophe
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 32.2012, 3, p. 2522-2529
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	bargaining \| successive monopoly \| asymmetric response times

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278588