Vertical mergers with input substitution : double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Moresi, Serge ; Schwartz, Marius |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 202.2021, p. 1-5
|
Subject: | Antitrust | Foreclosure | Input substitution | Vertical mergers | Theorie | Theory | Fusion | Merger | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Faktorsubstitution | Factor substitution | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Monopol | Monopoly | Unternehmenskonzentration | Market concentration |
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