Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
Year of publication: |
June 2016
|
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Authors: | Celik, Levent ; Karabay, Bilgehan |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 189247-2. - Vol. 81.2016, 1, p. 33-52
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Subject: | Multilateral bargaining | Equilibrium uniqueness | Veto players | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Veto | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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