Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
Year of publication: |
June 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Celik, Levent ; Karabay, Bilgehan |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 189247-2. - Vol. 81.2016, 1, p. 33-52
|
Subject: | Multilateral bargaining | Equilibrium uniqueness | Veto players | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Veto | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model |
-
Coalitional games with veto players : myopic and rational behavior
Arin, Javier, (2012)
-
A Bargaining Procedure Leading to the Serial Rule in Games with Veto Players
Arin Aguirre, Javier, (2015)
-
Veto Power and Coalition Formation in the Commons : An Experiment
Willinger, Marc, (2021)
- More ...
-
Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining
Celik, Levent, (2013)
-
When is it Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-track Authority
Celik, Levent, (2012)
-
Trade Policy Making in a Model of Legislative Bargaining
Celik, Levent, (2011)
- More ...