Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
A binary relation is indifference-transitive if its symmetric part satisfies the transitivity axiom. We investigated the properties of Arrovian aggregation rules that generate acyclic and indifference-transitive social preferences. We proved that there exists unique vetoer in the rule if the number of alternatives is greater than or equal to four. We provided a classification of decisive structures in aggregation rules where the number of alternatives is equal to three. Furthermore, we showed that the coexistence of a vetoer and a tie-making group, which generates social indifference, is inevitable if the rule satisfies the indifference unanimity. The relationship between the vetoer and the tie-making group, i.e., whether the vetoer belongs to the tie-making group or not, determines the power structure of the rule. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Iritani, Jun ; Kamo, Tomoyuki ; Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 40.2013, 1, p. 155-171
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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