Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy
Year of publication: |
1996
|
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Authors: | Keser, Claudia |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 50.1996, 3, p. 359-366
|
Subject: | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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