Voluntary cooperation based on equilibrium retribution: an experiment testing finite-horizon folk theorems
Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected a longer time horizon promotes cooperation.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Bruttel, Lisa V. ; Güth, Werner ; Kamecke, Ulrich ; Popova, Vera |
Publisher: |
Jena : Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |
Subject: | Gefangenendilemma | Kooperation | Extensives Spiel | Folk-Theorem | Test | Folk theorem | Finite horizon | Prisoners' dilemma | Experiment |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | Jena Economic Research Papers ; 2009,030 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 598703527 [GVK] hdl:10419/31715 [Handle] |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266648